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A number of commentators have made reference to the doctrine of cre­
ation in Kierkegaard s works. Scholars such as Michael Plekon and Kresten 
Nordentoft point to its relevance while Louis Dupre makes note of 
Kierkegaard s belief that because God created us, there is a certain »given­
ness« to human nature that we cannot manipulate.2 More extensive treat­
ments are given by Arnold Come and Valter Lindstrom, both of whom 
show the pervasiveness of the doctrine of creation in Kierkegaard s writ­
ings. While Come argues that Kierkegaard s use of creation has only a pos­
itive role in establishing the goodness and uniqueness of each individual, 
Lindstrom takes a more »traditional« approach in his attempt to disclaim the 
arguments of William Anz and others that Kierkegaard was indifferent or 
antagonistic towards »creation-centered faith.«3 Lindstrom, like Gregor 
Malantschuk, emphasizes Kierkegaards belief that Gods creation of the 
world from nothing establishes Gods authority and our consequent »bond 
service« (WL 115; SV1 9 ,112).4
Nevertheless, Come, Lindstrom and Malantschuk fail to examine, or 
even notice, how Kierkegaard incorporates the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo 
in his anthropology. Kierkegaard argues that we, unlike the rest of creation, 
actually have an awareness of Gods creation of us from nothing through 
our moment by moment choices. Each choice or leap we make is an actu­
alization of a possibility and this process »repeats« Gods creation of us from 
the »nothingness« of possibility. So as we engage our own possibilities of 
choice we sense our own nothingness and contingency. Because we are 
self-relational creatures whose deepest longing is for eternal blessedness, we 
use our wills to shield ourselves from this reality instead of yielding our 
wills to God in unconditional obedience. According to Kierkegaard, how­
ever, this trust in our own wills is actually »presumption« [Formastelse]
before God which results in the loss of Gods loving presence in our lives 
(WL 115; SV t 9,112).5 Kierkegaards understanding of the Fall, the stages, 
and the Paradox is based upon this basic struggle within each individual. 
This paper, then, will go further than Lindstrom’s claim that the doctrine 
of creatio ex nihilo was »one of the most prominent features in 
[Kierkegaard’s] writings,« and demonstrate how the doctrine is actually the 
»basic ontological position« of his anthropology.6
I.A Theoretical Assumption
Before examining the inner logic of our presumption before God, it is 
important to show the broader theoretical implications of the doctrine of 
creation in Kierkegaard’s thought. Kierkegaard maintains that because God 
is omnipotent, God did not have to rely on any preexisting plan or mat­
erials to create the world like Plato’s Demiurge. Furthermore, even though 
God gives the created world independence, creation does not sustain itself. 
God is in fact the continual creator so that everything would return to noth­
ing apart from God. He states in Practice in Christianity, »You...see many 
forces stirring in nature around you, but the power that supports it all you 
do not see, you do not see God’s omnipotence — and yet it is just as fully 
certain that he, too, is working, that one single moment without him and 
then the world is nothing« (PC 155; SV t 12,145). Kierkegaard will empha­
size this point by referring to Acts 17:28 where the apostle Paul states that 
»we live and move and have our being« in God (EUD 134; SV t 4, 32; CD 
63; SV t 10,67).
Kierkegaard does not believe his emphasis on God’s omnipotence 
compels him to advocate the type of pantheism he sees evident in the 
romantics that would obviate any sense of human freedom. In his journals, 
Kierkegaard even states that omnipotence is a necessary precondition for 
the relative freedom we possess (JP 2, 1251; Pap.VII1 A 181).The basis for 
this claim becomes clear by way of contrast with human interaction in 
which our wills are relative to one another. Between two humans, the more 
power one person exerts over another, the more the latter is dependent for 
his or her choices upon the former. So the more power an individual exerts 
the less free the other actually is in relation to that individual (WL 270; SV t 
9, 258). Kierkegaard states, »This is why one human being cannot make 
another person wholly free, because the one who has power is himself cap­
tive in having it and therefore continually has a wrong relationship to the 
one whom he wants to make free« (JP 2,1251; Pap.VII1 A 181). In contrast,
Kierkegaard claims that the »unique qualification« of omnipotence is that 
it can »withdraw itself again in a manifestation of omnipotence in such a 
way that precisely for this reason that which has originated through 
omnipotence can be independent« (JP 2, 1251; Pop. VII1 A 181). Gods 
causality is not relative to ours so that God does not override or cancel out 
our choices nor do our choices impinge upon God.7 Kierkegaard express­
es this by saying that »Omnipotence is not ensconced in a relationship to 
an other, for there is no other to which it is comparable.« This is another 
way of stating that God is transcendent to creation so that God is not bound 
by space/time relations.8 Because God is not a member of creation, His 
causality and presence in the world is absolutely different from humanity so 
that the way that God creates the world and acts in the world is sui generis. 
Kierkegaard makes this point in Philosophical Fragments by stating that we 
do not have the means to compare God against ourselves. God is not rela­
tive to us but absolutely different (PF 4; S VI, 212).
As his critique of Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger demonstrates, 
Kierkegaard already held this dialectical view of Gods omnipotence by 
the time he wrote Concept of Irony.9 Kierkegaard supports Solger s idea of 
humanity as a Nichtige, a nullity, because Solger realizes the »nothingness 
of everything« (Cl 309; SV1 13,377). Kierkegaard is quick to say, though, 
that Solger s understanding of the nothingness of humanity is confused 
and limited. Because he cannot find any »concreteness« for the infinite or 
validity for the finite, morality has no value. Kierkegaard writes, »all fini- 
tude together with its moral and immoral striving vanishes in the meta­
physical contemplation that sees it as nothing« (Cl 312-313; SV1 13,380). 
As a result, Kierkegaard classifies Solger s treatment of creation as a »pan­
theistic absorption.«10 Kierkegaard claims that pantheism can arise in two 
ways, both of which reveal an un-dialectical understanding of how Gods 
omnipotence makes human freedom possible. Kierkegaard writes, »If I let 
the human race create God, then there is no conflict between God and 
man; if I let man disappear in God, then there is no conflict, either« (Cl 
314; SV1 13, 380). In Kierkegaards opinion, Solger is guilty of the latter. 
Because there is no substance to that which is created, there can be no 
sense of a conflict between God and humanity. In effect, Solger s under­
standing of the doctrine of creation does not allow him to see how we are 
»relatively freely acting causes« who can choose to disobey God (PF 76; 
SV1 4, 240).
II. Choice and Nothingness
Kierkegaard’s appreciation of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo did not end 
with the theoretical possibility of a dynamic interaction between God and 
humanity. Kierkegaard emphasizes that in the freedom Gods omnipotence 
provides, we must account for our tacit awareness of Gods creation and 
continual creation of us from nothing.11 Kierkegaard claims that we expe­
rience the reality of Gods continual positing of us through our own expe­
rience of decision making and how that dynamic of choice »points to« God 
(PF 76; SV1 4 ,240).12
In the »Interlude« of Philosophical Fragments, Kierkegaard argues that 
historical knowledge is based upon a willed belief of the individual, 
which, for Kierkegaard, demonstrates that our wills are always active. As he 
would later state in Works of Love, »The individual first begins his life with 
‘ergo,’ with belief. But most people live so negligently that they do not 
notice at all that in one way or another, every minute they live, they live 
by virtue of an ‘ergo,’ of a belief« (WL 230; SVI 9, 221).13 Here in the 
»Interlude,« Kierkegaard equates belief or choice with the transition of 
»coming into existence« and asks, »How is that changed which comes into 
existence [bliver til], or what is the change...of coming into existence?« 
Whatever constitutes this change, it is a change »in being and is from not 
existing to existing« (PF 73; SV1 4, 236-237).14 He states that while that 
which comes into existence goes from non-being to being, even in its state 
of non-being it must be something and answers that it must be a possibil­
ity.
Kierkegaard goes on to make a distinction between humanity and the 
rest of creation. He states that while nature »comes into existence« like us 
so that it has a history, it is not aware of this history. He writes that, »nature 
is too abstract to be dialectical.. .with respect to time,« and that its »imper­
fection is that it does not have a history in another sense.« Humanity has a 
sense of the historical because »its own coming into existence« contains 
»within itself a redoubling, that is a possibility of a coming into existence 
within its own coming into existence.« Kierkegaard’s point is that in our 
freedom, we make transitions or decisions which are analogous to God’s 
actualization of creation. In other words, God has us »come into existence« 
in such a way that we have the freedom to make decisions which are the 
»coming into existence« of a possibility we have presupposed before its 
actualization. Our »coming into existence« thus has within it a »coming 
into existence.« Every moment we continue to exist we make choices. Fur­
thermore, these choices involve a sense of our own contingency, that we are
a possibility that God, who »holds all actuality as possibility in his omnipo­
tent hand« has made actual (M271; SV1 14, 286).
With every analogy there is obviously a dis-analogy. In this case, our 
moment by moment decisions involve a relation to time to which God as 
eternally transcendent is not bound. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard does state, 
»The more special historical coming into existence comes into existence 
by way of a relatively freely acting cause, which in turn definitely points to 
an absolutely freely acting cause« (PF 75-76; SV t 4, 239-240).The ques­
tion is how we as freely acting causes in our historical knowledge »point 
to« God as the absolutely freely acting cause.15 Kierkegaard argues that our 
own creation of historical knowledge involves belief, and coming to that 
belief »repeats« the initial possibility of the event, the possibility that God 
made actual (PF 86; SV1 4, 249).
Kierkegaard makes this point in his example of the »perceiver« who 
wants to become aware of the reality of a star. He first claims that the 
moment we receive impressions we cannot doubt their occurrence, but the 
very next moment, the occurrence as a past event becomes equivocal to the 
perceiver of the star (PF 81; S VI 4, 244). He states, »When the perceiver 
sees a star, the star becomes dubious for him the moment he seeks to 
become aware that it has come into existence. It is just as if reflection 
removed the star from his senses« (PF 81; S Vi 4, 245).
To understand how reflection provides the occasion of doubt, it is 
important to examine Kierkegaard s theory of the relation of consciousness 
to reflection. In the last section of De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Kierkegaard 
constructs a transcendental argument for the triadic structure of con­
sciousness. Kierkegaard takes the reality of doubt as given and asks what 
must be the case for doubt to be possible (PF 166; Pap. IV B 1, p. 144). He 
rejects the possibility that doubt comes from outside of consciousness 
because the same »occasioning phenomenon« could lead to doubt or faith 
whereas two opposite occasioning phenomena could lead to doubt or 
faith. So, Kierkegaard concludes, doubt must come from consciousness 
itself and the relation between reflection and consciousness.
Kierkegaard argues that consciousness is made up of a contradiction 
between what he calls ideality and reality, or what is believed to be the case 
and what is the case. An immediate impression, for example, is reality while 
ideality would be the proposition we create about that occasioning phe­
nomenon. Kierkegaard s way of putting this is that immediacy is reality 
whereas mediacy is »the word« which cancels immediacy by »giving 
expression to it« (PF 167-168; Pap. IV 4 B 1, p. 146).When consciousness
comes to reflect on their relation, when it relates the two and asks whether 
they correspond, there is the possibility of doubt. Consciousness has the 
ability to reflect on their relation and ask about the truth of the relation, 
but in asking that question, consciousness must consider the possibility of 
»un-truth,« that it is not the case that ideality and reality correspond (PF 
167; Pap. IV 4 B 1, p. 146). In his journals, Kierkegaard makes this point by 
saying that every possibility entails its »counter possibility« {JP 3,3707; Pap. 
X1 A 66). Reflection, then, creates a moment in which the relation 
becomes uncertain, ambivalent, or, as Kierkegaard likes to put it, »dubious.« 
In the star example, the perceiver creates a moment of reflection in which 
it is not necessarily the case that a previous sensory impression has hap­
pened. In the moment of reflection the possibility that it did occur is nec­
essarily considered alongside its »counter possibility,« that it did not come 
into existence. To cancel that moment of uncertainty, consciousness must 
make a resolution that the event did happen. As Kierkegaard states, belief 
does not give the star »being« but makes certain to consciousness that it did 
in fact exist. Consciousness must then be the »organ for the historical« 
which in its process of creating historical knowledge cancels the incerti­
tude of its own reflection. Kierkegaard writes that »belief is not a know­
ledge but an act of freedom, an expression of the will. It believes the com­
ing into existence and has annulled in itself the incertitude that corresponds 
to the nothingness of that which is not« (PF 83; SV1 4, 247).
Because consciousness can make the occurrence of the event a possi­
bility in its own moment of reflection, it realizes that the event did not nec­
essarily have to come into existence. Everything that comes into existence 
must be contingent and therefore neither self-creating nor self-sustaining. 
Kierkegaard writes, »The possibility from which emerged the possible that 
became actual always accompanies that which came into existence and 
remains with the past, even though centuries lie between. As soon as one 
who comes later repeats that it has come into existence.. .he repeats its pos­
sibility« (PF 86; SV t 4,249). In the creation of historical knowledge, then, 
each individual re-creates Gods moment by moment creation of the world 
by first making an event a possibility and then willing, or believing, that 
event as an actuality that did transpire.16 In repeating an events possibility, 
our willed-creation of historical knowledge »points to« Gods creation of 
the world from the nothingness of possibility.
III. Anxiety and the Fall
In his journals Kierkegaard makes a crucial distinction between the way 
consciousness relates to itself as the relation between ideality and reality. 
Consciousness can bring reality into relation with ideality, in which con­
sciousness asks whether or not something has occurred. Or consciousness 
can relate ideality with reality, and this, according to Kierkegaard, is the 
ethical in which consciousness is interested in itself {JP1,891; Pap. IV B 13: 
18,19). While the former deliberation of consciousness is backward look­
ing, so to speak, the latter regards the future and the self s quest for a true 
and meaningful self-identity. In both cases, however, the self or conscious­
ness must still grapple with the nothingness of possibility, which repeats 
Gods continual creation from nothing. An important aspect of that strug­
gle is the self s felt need to cancel the »unrest« over the incertitude of pos­
sibility. Kierkegaard calls this unrest, anxiety.
Before examining how Kierkegaard incorporates anxiety in his inter­
pretation of the Fall in The Concept of Anxiety, it is helpful to look at an 
example of this moment of unrest from his journals. Kierkegaard states that 
when a judge is uncertain about a case, he will, of course, make an investi­
gation. If he is still uncertain, he will dismiss the charge and though noth­
ing seems to have been accomplished, the judge has at least made a resolu­
tion that he is uncertain. Kierkegaard writes, »he was uncertain as to how 
he should judge; now he is no longer uncertain, now his verdict is ready: 
he judges that he is uncertain. He rests in that, for one cannot rest in uncer­
tainty, but one can rest when one has determined it« (JP V 5620; Pap. IV B 
10). Kierkegaard claims that we are so constituted that we cannot stand a 
situation of unrest; we must make a decision in order to do away with the 
restlessness of uncertainty because in that moment when we consider the 
possibilities of actions, the possibilities as non-being create an »empty 
space« we want to fill or cancel through a choice (TDIO 89; SV1 5 241). 
Just as nature abhors a vacuum [horror vacui\, we cancel the terror of the 
nothingness of possibility by annihilating its uncertainty through actuality. 
Kierkegaard writes that our experience of anxiety is before this empty 
space [det tomme Rum] so that this emptiness becomes the »impelling« [frem- 
skyndende] power in the life of spirit (Pap. VI B 122, 2; TDIO  89; SV1 5, 
241).17
The Concept of Anxiety examines this moment in which we consider 
possibilities for actions. Kierkegaard writes that his psychological delibera­
tion creates a »still-life of sin s possibility« and examines the individual in 
that moment of »restless repose« [hevceget Rolighed] (CA 21-22; SV t 4,
294).18 While in Philosophical Fragments and De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, 
Kierkegaard discusses how consciousness as the organ of the historical can­
cels the uncertainty or un-sureness of being, here in The Concept of Anxiety 
Kierkegaard examines the interest or passion generated by consciousness’ 
moment of reflection. Because consciousness is the relation between ideal­
ity and reality, consciousness »awakens« to itself when it realizes the colli­
sion between the two, when it considers the possibility that the two do not 
necessarily relate (PF 171; Pap. IV B 1, 149). In that moment of ambiva­
lence consciousness senses the nothingness of possibility, the empty space, 
and because consciouness cannot tolerate that unrest, it must choose.
In De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Kierkegaard states that because con­
sciousness is the relation and so presupposes reflection, it is consciousness 
that takes interest in the relation. He writes that consciousness is the third 
to the relation that relates the two sides of the relation (PF 169; Pap. IV B 
1,147-148). In The Concept of Anxiety and later in The Sickness Unto Death, 
Kierkegaard expands upon this triadic structure of consciousness but stat­
ing that consciousness, or spirit, is a relation that relates to itself (CA 44; 
SV1 4, 315; SUD 13; SV1 11, 127).19 Every possibility that consciousness 
or the self ponders is ultimately a possibility of the self. Because the self 
generates these possibilities, the self is passionately connected to these pos­
sibilities and its freedom is »entangled« by the fact that its choices are always 
based upon defining itself (CA 49; SV1 4, 320). In The Concept of Anxiety, 
Kierkegaard shows how anxiety is the way in which the self relates to these 
possibilities of itself. Every possibility and counter-possibility is a possibili­
ty of the self to which it is both attracted and repulsed. Those two oppos­
ing powers work in tension with each other to create the passion from 
which a decision or leap that resolves the unrest is made. This is why 
Kierkegaard writes that anxiety is »a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathe­
tic sympathy« (CA 42; SV t 4, 313).
Kierkegaard describes this moment of uncertainty or anxiety as »free­
dom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility« (CA 42; S VI 4, 313). To 
understand what this means it is first important to appreciate Kierkegaard’s 
distinction between innocence and immediacy. He writes that prior to the 
Fall, Adam and Eve are qualified »in immediate unity with his natural con­
dition.« This immediacy, however, is not the same as the immediacy 
Kierkegaard discusses in De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. Instead Kierkegaard 
describes this immediacy as ignorance of the knowledge of good and evil, 
which, according to Kierkegaard, is the knowledge of want, separation, 
perdition, and death. He writes,
Only of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was man not allowed 
to eat -  lest the knowledge should enter the world and bring grief along 
with it: the pain of want and the dubious happiness of possession, the ter­
ror of separation and the difficulty of separation, the disquietude of delib­
eration and the worry of deliberation, the distress of choice and the deci­
sion of choice, the judgment of the law and the condemnation of the law, 
the possibility of perdition and the anxiety of perdition, the suffering of 
death and the expectation of death (EUD 125; SVi 4,25).
In their state of innocence, Adam and Eve do not appreciate the import of 
this possibility of separation. They live in harmony with the external world 
because there is immediate trust in God; they do not doubt from where 
[hvorfra] comes the good for them or that that which they receive from God 
is good (EUD 127; SVI 4,26). Kierkegaard writes that there is still anxiety 
in this state of innocence because the self, even though it is not qualified as 
spirit, is still generating possibilities for itself in its moment by moment 
choices. With those possibilities comes a sense of nothingness against which 
the self becomes anxious. The self »awakens« to itself, in the same sense as 
consciousness awakens in the collision between ideality and reality, through 
the prohibition not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. 
For Adam and Eve in their innocence, the prohibition intensifies the 
ambivalence of the possibilities their freedom creates for it reminds them 
that they are able to choose or not to choose to eat of the fruit. Because 
they consider these possibilities themselves, they must generate the 
moment of temptation in which they are put into a position of unrest 
because they are attracted and repulsed by both possibilities.
Furthermore, in the unrest or anxiety of this moment of reflection the 
self is faced with the uncertainty of possibility and the nothingness it 
entails. Just as the will as the organ of the historical repeats Gods making 
actual that which was previously only a possibility, so here the self is faced 
again with its own possibility, as that which is created out of nothing. 
Kierkegaard makes this point by comparing anxiety to the dizziness that 
occurs when one looks down into a »yawning abyss« (CM 61; SFI 4,331).20 
This abyss, this nothingness, is in the individuals own eye as he or she 
beholds the various possibilities of the self so that the individual is project­
ing his or her own nothingness in possibility. Here in the ethical consider­
ation of defining the self, or in positing the synthesis as Kierkegaard puts it, 
the self experiences a de-centering moment of nothingness and instead of 
»looking through« the external to the source of all good things, the self
grabs on to that which immediately presents itself in order to cancel the 
void or unrest of the nothingness of possibility. As Kierkegaard puts it, the 
self lays »hold of finiteness« to support itself (CA 61; SV t 4, 331).21 In the 
moment when the individual senses his or her own nothingness, the pos­
sibility of doubt over its own welfare, survival, and happiness becomes a real 
possibility. In that moment, the self does not continue to trust in God so 
that it is once again »absorbed in joy and glory,« but in the possibility of 
perdition and separation in the face of its own nothingness, the self grabs 
onto to that which immediately presents itself (EUD 126; SV t 4, 25).22 In 
that moment consciousness or spirit makes the resolution or qualitative 
leap to place its life in the things of this world (M 248; SV t 14, 262). As 
Kierkegaard puts it in »At a Graveside,« consciousness ennobles the exter­
nal (TDIO 74; SV t 5, 229).23 By trusting in the things of this finite and 
temporal world instead of »remaining in God,« Adam and Eve rebell against 
God because they loosened the »innermost« and »divine« joint of faith and 
trust in God (UDVS 269; SV t 8, 353). Because it is a willed position in 
which they demonstrate a lack of trust in God, their sin, along with that of 
everyone else, is primarily self-willfulness against God (SUD 81; SV t 11, 
193).
Every subsequent choice is still wrestling with the nothingness of pos­
sibility. Kierkegaard writes that reflection makes everything conditioned or 
non-necessary which entails the possibility or nothingness of everything of 
this world {JP 3, 3715; Pap. X4 A 525). Everything to which we give our 
trust in this world is ultimately a willed position where we first consider 
that choice of the self as a possibility. In that moment of deliberation, we 
sense the nothingness of the possibility which entails our own nothingness. 
Most likely, according to Kierkegaard, as we are about »to sink« into our 
»own nothingness,« we maintain by ourselves »the divers connection with 
the earthly« (EUD 305; SV t 5, 88).
IV. Ockham’s Razor?
Before showing how Kierkegaards understanding of humanity s awareness 
of nothingness informs his theory of the stages and the Paradox, it is impor­
tant to address Jean-Paul Sartre s development of the nothingness of con­
sciousness in Being and Nothingness.24 Sartre rejects the link between cre­
ation and consciousness and states that the »circle« within consciousness 
alone creates this sense of nothingness. Sartre argues that the sense of noth­
ingness we feel stems from the derivation of possibilities in consciousness
by our reflective capacities and thus the ability to be, in a modification of 
Heidegger, a question to ourselves, or pour-soi.25 With this question, we put 
ourselves in a position of »indétermination« which entails the »permanent 
possibility of non-being.«26 Because each individual is this dynamic 
between the self and what it is for itself, en-soi and pour-soi, the nothingness 
we experience is a product of the »structure« of consciousness.27
If Sartre is right, there would be no need, as Kierkegaard maintains, to 
incorporate the doctrine of creation to explain the sense of nothingness we 
experience in the process of decision making. We could apply our own ver­
sion of »Ockhams razor,« that »plurality should not be assumed without 
necessity,« and say that because the very structure of self-relationality 
exhaustively explains the phenomenon, an appeal to the doctrine of cre­
ation is superfluous.28
First it must be said that Sartre himself does not argue in an »Ockam’s 
razor« manner; he does not reject the doctrine of creation because the 
reflective nature of human consciousness fully explains the nothingness we 
experience. Sartre first rejects the doctrine of creation and the idea of God 
as omnipotent because such a God would make created beings wholly pas­
sive and thus fully absorbed in their Creator.29 Because there cannot be 
such a God, it must be the case that the nothingness we sense is a product of 
the structure of self-consciousness alone. So Sartre does not prove that the 
structure of self-consciousness exhaustively explains the phenomena of 
nothingness but merely claims that it must be the case. Moreover, 
Kierkegaard’s dialectical understanding of Gods omnipotence and human 
freedom exposes Sartre’s failure to respect Gods absolute difference from 
creation. For Sartre divine omnipotence must override our freedom, but 
Kierkegaard’s dialectical understanding of the compatibility between God’s 
omnipotence and human freedom makes it such that this is not necessari­
ly the case. An appeal to the doctrine of creation could still be warranted 
to explain the phenomenon of emptiness.
Although Kierkegaard never directly addressed this possible critique, it 
does make us sensitive to the singular importance of the disjunction he 
poses at the beginning of The Sickness Unto Death. He states that the ques­
tion of whether we have »established« ourselves determines the dynamics 
within our self-relationality. He writes that »such a relation, that relates to 
itself, a self, must either have established itself, or be established by anoth­
er« (SUD 13; S VI 11,127).30 Kierkegaard at first simply states that the lat­
ter is the case such that the »human self is such a derived, established rela­
tion, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself to
another« (SUD 13-14; SV1 11,128).31 He then offers a defense of his posi­
tion, an apologetic if you will, that shows why God’s continual creation of 
us out of nothing is essential for understanding human experience.32
Kierkegaard writes that if we created our self-relationality, there would 
only be one form of despair, in despair not to will to be oneself. The ideal 
itself, however, is completely up to the individual to determine.33 
Kierkegaard claims that this simply cannot be the case because it is not com­
prehensive enough. Such a position does not cover all the possible forms of 
human movement prevalent in the various forms of despair with the result 
that it does not provide »the definition« that, »like a net, embraces all forms« 
(SUD 82; SV1 11, 194).34 Kierkegaard maintains that even if we fully 
appropriated our nothingness, as Sartre would have us do, and strove with 
all our will power to live authentically, this would still be a manifestation of 
despair. The effort would be the product of a contingent, finite being try­
ing to give itself a sense of eternal and infinite significance, which manifests 
a self trying to live independently from its Creator. According to 
Kierkegaard, it must be the case, then, that there is not one but two forms 
of despair, not to will to be oneself and »in despair to will to be oneself« 
(SUD 14; SV1 11,128).
While both forms of despair reflect our sinfulness before God, the lat­
ter especially manifests our rebellion against the reality of our complete 
dependence upon God as Creator. Kierkegaard writes that because there is 
this second form of despair that derives from the fact that we have not cre­
ated ourselves, despair ultimately becomes an issue of not admitting who 
we are in terms of our relationship with God; it is to be in a state of pre­
sumption before God. In »The Care of Presumptuousness,« Kierkegaard 
states that if we in any way act apart from an admission of our dependen­
cy upon God for our very existence, we become presumptuous. He writes, 
»It is first and foremost presumptuousness to be spiritlessly ignorant of how 
a person needs God’s help at every moment and that without God he is noth­
ing« (CD 63; SVI 10, 67).35 In contrast, the Christian, or the ideal that 
Kierkegaard upholds, is »once and for all aware of God« and knows that »to 
need God is a human being’s perfection« (CD 64; SV1 10, 68).
V. Sin and Atonement
For Kierkegaard, the admission of our need for God is pivotal for entering 
the position of rest and peace for which we long because it is only out of 
the recognition of our powerlessness that we will yield ourselves to God.
To understand why Kierkegaard would say this it is important to see how 
he correlates creation and soteriology. Kierkegaard maintains that God cre­
ated us such that we ultimately long for an infinite, eternal good, and God 
alone is that good. Although Kierkegaard does not advocate passivity or a 
physical removal from the world, he does shows some affinity to Christian 
mysticism when he states that the »good« is to know God (UDVS 107; 5 VI 
8,203; EUD 321; SVI 5 ,102).36 For Kierkegaard, then, there is an essential 
»correlation« between the dynamic of the human spirit and the relation­
ship of the self to God.37 We are creatures who fundamentally seek mean­
ing and fulfillment, and we are, according to Kierkegaard, to find evig 
Salighed in our relationship to God alone.38
In Kierkegaard s understanding of the »appropriate« relation between 
God and humanity, the doctrine of creation again proves »foundational« 
because Kierkegaard says that it is not a relationship of »like to like;« 
because we are creatures and God is the omnipotent Creator, we cannot 
relate to God directly but »inversely« (UDVS 193; SVI 8, 279). For 
Kierkegaard this means that we are to yield ourselves voluntarily to God, to 
prostrate ourselves in adoration and so »be nothing by worshiping« (UDVS 
193; SV i 8,279; SUD 86; SV i 11, 198).39 Kierkegaard calls this submission 
of our wills to God, the death of the self because the self must relinquish all 
trust in itself to stave off the nothingness of its existence. Instead of running 
from this reality, the self embraces it or appropriates the reality of its con­
tingency so that it admits that »a human being is nothing at all« (TDIO 83; 
SVI 5, 237). In that moment of decision the person does not choose the 
things of this world through self-assertion but yields his or her will and 
chooses intimacy with God (UDVS 107, 207; SVI 8, 203, 291-292).
In our presumption towards God, however, we trust more in our abil­
ity to create and sustain a meaningful life through our own »will-power« 
instead of finding »life« in God. We are, as Kierkegaard puts it, nothing that 
has tried to make itself something (EUD 309; SVI 5, 91). Kierkegaards 
description of Jesus Christ as the Absolute Paradox must be seen in the light 
of this essential »struggle« between God and humanity in order to under­
stand its true soteriological import. According to Kierkegaard, Jesus as the 
Paradox is the means by which God draws us back into an appropriate 
God-relationship by confronting us with the necessity of the submission of 
our wills. This confrontation creates the offense of the Paradox. Kierkegaard 
himself makes this evident when he states, »There is something else, some­
thing even deeper within you, and it is for your own salvation that it is 
taken away from you, and yet to our own harm there is nothing you clutch
so tightly and nothing that clutches you as tightly...it is one’s own will« 
(CD 84; SV t 10,87).
Because our nothingness is always presented to us in the possibilities we 
generate for ourselves, the reality of our need for God versus our »natural« 
trust in ourselves is the essential, existential struggle raging within the inner 
being of every individual. Although we are tacitly aware of this reality, we 
have the capacity through self-deception to hide from this reality. In The 
Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains this dynamic by describing 
humanity’s fall from God into finitude as a combination of weakness and 
strength. This dialectical understanding of sin becomes clear in the contrast 
he makes between humanity and the devil. Kierkegaard writes that Satan is 
completely aware his rebellion against God because he is sheer spirit.There 
is no finitude to which the devil grabs in order to support himself against 
God and so serve »as a mitigating excuse« (SUD 42; SV i 11,154). Humans, 
on the other hand, rebel against God in defiance but grab onto finitude and 
temporality in order to run away from this reality. Our weakness is to evade 
our responsibility by clouding our consciousness from this truth about our­
selves, avoiding transparency, so as to make it appear as if we are not in need 
of God (CD 181; SVI 10,183; UDVS 23; SVI 8,133).The most conven­
ient form of this evasion is to do away with the awareness of the self as »the 
single individual« by focusing instead on externals and the future. It is to go 
from the consciousness of oneself who stands before God to living one’s life 
in sensate categories where there is not a conscious awareness of oneself as 
a constant amid the flux of temporality. This is the state of objectivity or 
what Kierkegaard calls the aesthetic stage.
Kierkegaard’s stages of existence, then, are not merely a schema to 
describe the various ways people act in life.40 They are the result of a self- 
relational being struggling to avoid the truth about itself. This struggle is 
constant while the resolution of the conflict has various results. It can be 
said, then, that the stages provide the particular manifestations of how the 
self uses its will to deny its nothingness. So while the root struggle or issue 
of each stage is the individual’s control of his or her will to cancel out the 
void of existence, the exercise of the will manifests itself in different ways. 
Those various results are classified into the stages of existence.
Furthermore, because each »progression« to a higher stage is yet anoth­
er manifestation of our rebellion against God, Kierkegaard’s theory of the 
stages should not be construed as implying any form of Pelagianism, as if 
the progression of the stages leads to faith.41 Each progression to a higher 
stage up to Religiouness A is a movement of the self against the felt failure
of the present stage of existence. The self in its will and imagination re­
defines its world and itself in that world so as to reestablish some sense of 
meaning and significance. So we see that the self is always looking for 
meaning and fulfillment, but in each stage prior to Religiousness B, the self 
looks to its own self to create that meaning. Even in religiousness A where 
the individual incorporates a sense of nothingness and guilt, the person 
generates the position in the power of the »natural man« as Kierkegaard 
puts it. An individual in this stage still uses his or her will to create and sus­
tain this position of self-annihilation so that he or she does not admit his 
or her powerlessness before God. The individual still believes that he or she 
alone can establish an appropriate relationship to God instead of admitting 
that even the »most honest striving is nothing« before God {JFY 167; S VI 
12, 439). Because it is a self-willed position in which the individual rejects 
the help God offers in Jesus Christ, religiousness A manifests itself as a posi­
tion of rebellion against God.
The Paradox that Jesus Christ presents, in order to be the paradox, 
relates to this fundamental concern of each individual by showing that all 
the efforts of the individual in the power of »the natural man« to create and 
sustain meaning are nothing.42 The Paradox is an offense because it ulti­
mately demands the very thing the self has tried to protect all along 
through the stages, its belief that life is found through the power of self- 
assertion. So Kierkegaard writes, »Offense ultimately is occasion for an 
individual in relation to the essential when someone wants to make new 
for him what he essentially believes he already has« (CUP 539; SV i 7,471). 
The offense, then, is not essentially a cognitive concern but relates prima­
rily to the longing for life or eternal blessedness. As N.H. Soe puts it, the 
offense is not so much against the head as it is against the heart or the inner 
being.43 The person who will not submit his or her will to God will walk 
away from the help Jesus offers as the Paradox whereas the person who 
seeks helps in his or her powerlessness to cancel the void and meaningless­
ness of existence will come to enjoy, according to Kierkegaard, at-onement 
with God.
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